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Wireless  sensor networks  consist  of  hundreds  to  thousands  of 
sensor  nodes  and  are  widely  used  in  civilian  and  security 
applications.  One  of  the  serious  physical  attacks  faced by  the 
wireless  sensor  network  is  node  clone  attack.  Thus  two  node 
clone  detection  protocols  are  introduced  via  distributed  hash 
table and randomly directed exploration to detect node clones. 
The  former  is  based  on  a  hash  table  value  which  is  already 
distributed and provides key based facilities like checking and 
caching to detect node clones. The later one is using probabilistic 
directed  forwarding  technique  and border determination.  The 
simulation results for storage consumption, communication cost 
and  detection  probability  is  done  using  NS2  and  obtained 
randomly  directed  exploration  is  the  best  one  having  low 
communication  cost  and  storage  consumption  and  has  good 
detection probability. 
Keywords: wireless sensor networks (wsn), distributed hash table, 
randomly directed exploration.
I.INTRODUCTION
A wireless sensor network (wsn) is a high and new technology 
consists  of  spatially  distributed  autonomous  sensors  to 
monitor physical or environmental conditions and to pass data 
through the network to a main location. It is built of hundreds 
or thousands of nodes and each node act as sensor. Wireless 
sensor  network  consists  of  base  stations  and  number  of 
wireless sensors. These sensors node network has transceiver, 
micro controller, electronic circuit and energy source. Sensor 
networks have significant constrains and the individual sensor 
nodes are typically inexpensive, tiny, distributed, low power 
and low complexity nodes which used lightweight processors 
and  cheap  hardware  components  of  low tamper  résistance. 
And  these  sensor  nodes  are  often  deployed  in  hostile 
environments,  are  highly  independent  and  require  only  a 
minimum amount  of  supervision.  The  cost  of  these  sensor 
nodes depend on resources  such as energy,  memory,  speed, 
bandwidth  etc..They  are  widely  used  in  physical  and 
environmental situations. The wireless sensor network avoids 
the use of lot of wiring, can accommodate any devices at any 
time, and is accessed through centralized monitor and highly 
flexible  [8].  The  main  goal  of  wsn  is  to  reduce  power 
consumption and to optimize computing resources.
The bandwidth range of wsn is radio frequency. Wsn are ad 
hoc networks  (wireless  nodes  that  self  organize  into  an 
infrastructure  less  network).  In  contrast  to  other  adhoc 
network, wsn need essentially sensing and data processing. It 
has many more nodes and is densely deployed [8]. Hardware 
must  be  cheap  and  nodes  are  more  prone  to  failures. 
Communication scheme is many to one (data collected at base 
station) rather than peer to peer and nodes are static.
The  main  problems  deals  with  wsn  are  easy  to  hack,  low 
speed of communication, high cost and interference.  Because 
of  this  hackers  many attacks affects  the wsn.  Among those 
attacks serious and dangerous one is node clone attack. In this 
attack the adversary may capture some nodes in the network 
when they are in hostile environment and extract the secret 
credentials data and information from nodes,  reprograms or 
modifies the data and creates replicas or clones of such nodes 
in the network. Then these compromised nodes plays active in 
network and thus the adversary may gain the control over the 
network [1]. Thus security of network had lost and more over 
these cloned nodes can create more attacks like DoS inside the 
network which corrupts the information [2]. If these clones 
are left undetected, the network is unshielded to attackers and 
thus extremely vulnerable [3].
Therefore  in  this  paper,  an  effective  two novel  node clone 
detection  protocols  are  proposed  to  detect  the node clones. 
The  previous  works  incurs  more  communication  cost  and 
required to transmit more messages resulted in the reduction 
of  life  time.  The  first  one  is  distributed  hash  table (DHT) 
which is based on hash table value of (key, record) by which a 
fully decentralized, key-based caching and checking system is 
constructed  to  catch  nodes.  DHT  enables  sensor  nodes  to 
construct  the  over lay network.  The key plays  vital  role  in 
DHT mechanism which determines the destination node of the 
message [1]. But this DHT incurs same communication cost 
as  previous,  have  some  storage  consumption  and  strong 
detection  probability.  Second  one  is  distributed  detection 
protocol,  named  randomly  directed  exploration  (RDE) in 
which probabilistic directed forwarding technique along with 
random initial direction and border determination. Every node 
contains  signed  version  of  neighbor  list  and  the  detection 
round is initiated by sending claiming message by the nodes to 
randomly selected neighbors [5]. The communication cost is 
reduced by using border determination. And this protocol has 
to  store  only  the  list  of  neighbor  nodes  so  consumes  less 
memory.  So the RDE stands with low communication cost, 
less storage consumption and high detection probability. The 
RDE and DHT protocols  are  only used  to  detect  the  node 
clones in the wsn..
The rest of paper is organized as follows. First the previous 
counter measures  are discussed in Section II.  Then, present 
preliminaries in Section III. After wards detailed description 
about DHT and its performance in Section IV.  The RDE is 
detailed in Section V with its performance. Finally conclude 
the work in Section VI. 
II.PREVIOUS WORKS
The  earliest  method  to  detect  node  clones  was  prevention 
schemes and key plays the main role which provided to nodes 
by mobile trusted agents. The private key of node comprises 
of  location  and  identity.  But  the  problems  arise  here  are 
attackers  may  takes  some  time  to  compromise  the  nodes 
(compromising time)  in  the  network.  As  the  compromising 
time decreases the number of clone nodes increases thus badly 
affects  the  security  of  the  network.   And  also  prevention 
scheme is applicable to only some specific applications. The 
assumption made on trusted agents is not too strong [7].
   In  the  centralized  detection method  a  base  station  is 
connected to each node. Each node sends a list of its neighbor 
nodes and location to base station. The communication cost is 
limited  by  constructing  subsets  of  nodes.  Even  though 
communication cost is reduced the life time expectancy of the 
network is decreased due to the communication burden of the 
nodes near to the base station [4].
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. Network Model
The network used is of large scale and have ‘n’ number of 
resource constrained sensor nodes. Each node has unique ID 
and a corresponding private key. The public key kα is the node 
ID and private key is kα-1. Message M signed by the node α 
using private key is [M] kα-1. The location and current relative 
time  of  every  node  is  determined  by  secure  localization 
protocol and secure time synchronization scheme respectively 
[1].  And  these  are  not  specifying  since  they  are  not  so 
important to proposed protocols. As per previous approaches 
the base station is not powerful in this model, instead of that 
an initiator plays as a trusted role for initiating the detection 
round  procedures.  During  node  clone  detection  the  sensor 
nodes are assumed to be stationary. So the node clone can be 
determined by the collision of location for one node ID [5].
B. Adversary Model
The sensor networks are more vulnerable to attacks in hostile 
environment.  The  adversary  can  capture  some  nodes,  can 
modify or reprogram it and obtains all the secret credentials 
data. Thus the compromised node creates replicas or clones of 
such mischievous nodes and adversary may gain control of the 
whole network by deploying these replicas in place that are 
decided intelligently. Adversary is always aware of detection 
protocol and manages to conceal the existence of clone [5]. 
Adversary interferes with the detection scheme in three ways. 
First,  cloned  nodes  may  not  participate  in  the  detection 
rounds.  Second,  cloned  nodes  may  drop  or  modify  the 
messages.  Lastly  they  take  some  time  to  compromise  the 
nodes is limited [1].
C. Performance Metrics
The performance metrics used to compare both protocols are
(i) Communication cost: the average number of messages sent 
per node is used to represent Communication cost.
(ii)  Storage  consumption: low  cost  sensors  have  limited 
amount memory. Average cache table size per node represents 
storage consumption.
(iii)  Detection probability: average number of witness nodes 
per node represents detection probability.
IV.DISTRIBUTED HASH TABLE
 Distributed Hash Table is the node clone detection protocol 
which provides  decentralization scheme with the key based 
caching and checking. Distributed Hash Table is based on a 
hash table of (key, record) pair which is already distributed. 
The distributed hash table enables the sensor nodes to form an 
overlay network. The key plays vital role in distributed hash 
table  and  key determines  where  to  send  the  message  from 
source node i.e. the destination node is determined by the key 
and source doesn’t know anything about the destination node. 
The detection round initiated by initiator by sending an action 
message  (involves  nonce,  seed,  and  time).  Then  every 
observer nodes constructs claiming message for each neighbor 
node,  referred  as  examinee  and  sends  the  message  with 
probability pc to reduce the communication over work.  The 
key which determine the destination node of message is the 
hash  value  of  concatenation  of  seed  and  examinee  ID  [1]. 
During  distributed  hash  table  detection  round  a  claiming 
message will transmitted to destination node which will cache 
ID- location pair and check for node clone detection.
 Distributed Hash Table is a decentralized distributed system 
which  provides  a  key based  look up service.  (Key,  record) 
pairs  are  stored  in  the  table  any active  node can  store  and 
retrieve records associated with specific keys. Thus distributed 
hash  table  maintain  mapping  from  keys  to  records  among 
nodes. Chord is used and choose chord as a distributed hash 
table implementation to demonstrate protocol. Massive virtual 
ring is formed by chord in which every node is located at one 
point, and owning a segment of the periphery. Hash function 
is used to achieve pseudo randomness on output by mapping 
an  arbitrary  input  into  a  b-bit  space  (in  the  ring).Chord 
coordinate is assigned for each node and can join the network. 
Here a node’s Chord point’s coordinate is the hash value of 
the  node’s  MAC address  [1].one  segment  that  ends  at  the 
node’s Chord point is related to every node, and all records 
whose keys fall into that segment will be transmitted to and 
stored in that node[5].Every node maintains a  finger table of 
size t= O (log n) to facilitate a binary-tree search. The finger 
table for a node with responsible for holding the t keys. 
TABLE I
DISTRIBUTED DETECTION PROTOCOLS COMPARISON, WHERE n IS NETWORK SIZE, d NODE DEGREE
Protocols Nodes requirements Communication cost Memory cost Detection Cost
Node to network broadcasting Neighbors information O (n) O(d) Strong
Randomized multicast All nodes data O (n) O(d√n) Acceptable
Line selected All nodes data O (√n) O(d√n) Acceptable
RED Knowledge of network 
geography
O (√n) O(d√n) Strong
DHT DHT nodes information O (log n √n) O(d) Strong
RDE Neighbors information O (√n) O(d) Good
between 10 and 20. The DHT enable sensor nodes to construct a chord overlay network. Cloned node may not participate in this  
overlay network construction[1]. And this overlay network construction is independent of node clone detection. Nodes possess the 
information of their direct predecessor and successor in the Chord ring and also caches information of its consecutive successors in 
its  successors table[6]. The communication cost is thus reduced by this cache mechanism and it enhances systems robustness.  
Selection of inspectors is done using the facility of the successors table. 
Detection round stages
(i)The initial stage of detection round is done by activating all nodes by releasing an action message by initiator
MACT=nonce, seed, time, {nonce||seed||time} k-1initiator
During each rounds the value of nonce increases monotonously and it intended to prevent the DoS attacks.
(ii) By receiving the action message each node verifies the value of nonce with previous values and verifies the signature of the  
message. If both are valid node will updates the nonce and stores the seed. The node act as observer to generate claiming message  
for each neighbor at the designated action time and transmits the message through the overlay network with respect to the claiming 
probability pc.
Mα4β=idβ, Lβ, idα, Lα, { idβ ||Lβ ||idα ||Lα||nonce} k-1α.
where, Lα,  Lβ, are locations of α and β , respectively.
(iii) Chord intermediate nodes will forwards claiming message to its destination node. Only the source node, Chord intermediate  
nodes,  and the destination node need to process a  message,  whereas other  nodes along the path simply route the message to 
temporary targets.  Algorithm 1 for  handling a message and If  the algorithm returns  NIL,  then the message has  arrived at  its  
destination. Else the message will forwarded to the next node with the ID that is returned by Algorithm[1].
Algorithm 1: 
dht_ handle message(Mα4β) handle a message in the DHT-based detection, where y is the current node’s Chord coordinate, finger[i]  
is the first node on the ring that succeeds key((y+2b-I mod 2b ),I £ [1,t]  ,successors [j] is the next jth successor j £[1,g][1].
Output: NIL if the message arrives at its destination; otherwise, it is the ID of the next node that receives the message in the Chord  
overlay network[1].
1: key<=H (seed||idβ)
2: if key £ [predecessor] then {has reached destination}
3: inspect Mα4β {act as an inspector, see Algorithm 2}
4: return NIL
5: for i=1 to g do
6: if key £(y, successors [i]) then {destination is in the next Chord hop}
7: inspect Mα4β {act as an inspector, see Algorithm 2}
8: return successors [i]
9: for j= 1 to t do {for normal DHT routing process}
10: if key £ [(y+2b-I mod 2b ,y)], then
11: return finger [j]
12: return successor [g]
Algorithm 2: inspect Mα4β: Inspect a message to check for clone detection in the DHT-based detection protocol
1: verify the signature of Mα4β
2: if idβ found in cache table then
3: if idβ has two distinct locations {found clone, become a witness}
4: broadcast the evidence
5: else
6: buffer Mα4β into cache table
Message for node clone detection is examined by Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 compares the message with previous inspected 
messages that are buffered in the cache table[1]. All records in the cache table should have different examinee ID.  If there exist two  
messages Mα4β  and Mα’4β’ satisfying idβ = idβ’ and Lβ ≠Lβ shows that exists clone and then the witness node broadcasts the evidence to 
notify the whole network. All integrity nodes verify the evidence message and stop communicating with the cloned nodes. The 
witness does not need to sign the evidence message. 
D. Performance Analysis of DHT
Communication cost: The average path length between two random nodes by l which varies from O(log n) to O(√n).On the basis of  
Chord’s properties the number of transfers in the Chord overlay network is c log n , where c is a constant number, usually less than  
1. Therefore, the average path hop length of a message is cl log n[1]. There are pcdn claiming messages in total for a round of 
detection. Thus shown in fig 1(a) the average number of messages sent per node is given by p cdcl logn. Since the pc, d, and c are 
constant, the asymptotic communication cost of the DHT-based protocol is between O (log2 n) and O (√nlog n).     
Storage Consumption: In particular, protocol shows strong resilience against message-discarding by cloned nodes. In fact, the more  
cloned nodes, the less the size of cache tables for integrity nodes as storage consumption and the more witnesses as security level  
shown in figure 2 (a). Good pseudo-randomness of the Chord system, on average, every node stores one record in its cache table 
associated with one examinee’s ID as its destination, regardless of the number of claiming messages per examinee. Let p r denote the 
probability of a predecessor receiving a specific claiming message, then the probability of a predecessor holding a record for an 
examinee is 1-(1-pr) m. Average cache table size s=1+g(1-(1-pr)m)[1].
Detection probability: Even if there are 10% nodes that maliciously discard messages, the number of witnesses is pretty high. The g 
predecessor nodes of the destination may become witnesses if and only if they receive at least two claiming messages associated  
with different cloned nodes. Average witness number w=1+g(1-(1-pr)m)2,In an ideal case Average cache table size s =1+gm/g+m 
where there are m independent claiming messages for  each examinee and g is  the successors table size.  The average witness  
number, when there are two cloned nodes, is w=1+2gm2/(g+m)(g+2m)[1].
 
(a)
Figure 1.simulation results of DHT detection on number of nodes
(a)
Figure 2.simulation results of DHT detection on number of cloned nodes
(a)
Figure 3.simulation results of DHT detection on number of cloned nodes
V.RANDOMLY DIRECTED EXPLORATION
The problems associated with the dht are it incurs more communication cost because of the chord overlay network and thus it is 
sensitive to energy and storage consumption. To overcome these problems a new node clone detection protocol introduced namely 
randomly directed exploration. Here the each node only needs to know and buffer a neighbor list having all neighbors ID and 
locations. During detection round each node constructs claiming message with signed version of neighbor list and then deliver  
message to others which will compares with its own neighbor list to detect node clone. If there exists any node clone, one witness  
node successfully catches the clone and notifies the entire network by broadcasting. The efficient way to achieve randomly directed  
exploration needs some mechanisms and routing protocols. First the claiming message needs to provide maximum hop limit and it is 
sent to random neighbors. Then the further message transmission will maintain a line and this transmission line property enables a 
message to go through a network as fast as possible[6]. The communication cost of this protocol is low and it is limited by the  
border determination mechanism. And the assumption made here is that each node knows about its neighbors locations.
Detection round 
Initially the node clone detection round is activated by the initiator. At the right mentioned action time, each node creates its own 
neighbor list (ID of neighbor and location). Then that node act as an observer for all its neighbors and starts to generate claiming  
messages. The claiming message involves node ID, location and its neighbor list[6]. The claiming message by node is constructed 
by 
Mα=ttl, idα, Lα, neighbor list where ttl is time to live. 
Algorithm 3: rde-processmessage Mα: An intermediate node processes a message
1: verify the signature of Mα
2: compare its own neighbor-list with the neighbor-list in Mα
3: if found clone then
4: broadcast the evidence;
5: ttl<=ttl-1
6: if ttl ≤ 0 then
7: discard Mα
8: else
9: next node<=get next node (Mα) {See Algorithm 4}
10: if next node =NIL then
11: discard Mα
12: else
13: forward Mα to next node[6]
The intermediated nodes will change the value of ttl during transmission. In each time, the node transmits message to a random 
neighbor. When an intermediate node β receives a claiming message Mα, it launches rde-processmessage Mα. During the processing 
the node clone is detected by comparing the neighbor list of node which acts as inspector β with neighbor list in the message. If  
clone detected then the witness node β will broadcast an evidence message M evidence= (Mα,Mβ) to notify the whole network such that 
the cloned nodes are removed from the network[6]. Node decreases the message’s ttl by 1 and discards the message if ttl reaches 
zero during routing; otherwise it will query Algorithm 4 to determine the next node receiving the message.
Algorithm 4: get next node (Mα): To determine the next node that receives the message
1: determine ideal angle, target zone, and priority zone
2: if no neighbors within the target zone then
3: return NIL
4: if no neighbors within the priority zone then
5: next node<= the node closest to ideal angle
6: else
7: next node<= a probabilistic node in the priority zone, with respect to its probability proportional to angle distance from priority 
zone border
8: return next node[6].
Deterministic directed transmission: The ideal direction can be calculated when node receives a claiming message from previous 
node and  the next destination node should be closest to the ideal direction for the best effect of line transmission. Network border  
determination: The communication cost is reduced by taking network shape into consideration. Due to physical constrains in many 
sensor network applications, there exist outside borders.  The claiming message can be directly discarded when reaching some 
border in the network. To determine a target zone then no neighbor is found in this zone, target range is used along with ideal  
direction, the current node will conclude that the message has reached a border, and thus throw it away.  Probabilistic directed  
transmission: priority range along with the ideal direction is used to specify a priority zone, in which the next node will be selected.  
The deterministic directed candidate within the target zone will be selected as the next node when no nodes are located in that zone,.  
If there are several nodes in the priority zone, their selection probabilities are proportional to their angle distances to priority zone 
border.  As  a result,  to  reduce  detection probability dramatically the  adversary may remove some nodes in  strategic  locations 
Claiming messages transmissions from a cloned node’s neighbors are highly correlated, which affects the protocol communication  
and  security  performance[1].  Those  drawbacks  are  overcome,  by  the  probabilistic  directed  mechanism,  and  the  protocol 
performance is improved significantly 
Figure 4 simulation  results of RDE on varying size networ
.. 
E.Performance  Analysis  of  RDE
Communication  cost:  The RDE’s  communication  cost  depends  on  the  routing 
parameter settings. On average, there are r claiming messages sent by each observer, 
and each message transmits at most ttl hops , r is a constant small number, say 1 for a 
dense  network,  but  ttl  is generally  related  to  the  network  size  .  So  ttl=√n 
because there are nodes in the network, and by the line property of  protocol routing, 
it  is  very  likely  for  any  two nodes  to  be  reachable  within  √n  hops  for  a  normal 
network  topology[6].  In  other words, ttl=√n would be sufficient for messages to go 
across the network. The upper bound of communication cost in the randomly directed 
exploration protocol is O√n and its shown in fig 4 (a)
Detection  probability: Relieving  message-discarding  and  protecting  witness  are  achieved  by  random  initial  direction  and 
probabilistic directed transmission. By them, there is no critical location to affect message transmission, which limits the capacity of 
message-discarding, and every neighbor of a cloned node has similar potential to become witness so it is hard for the adversary to  
get rid of witness in advance[1]. The RDE protocol’s detection probability is determined by the number of nodes that are reached  
when randomly drawing lines where each has a random initial angular and fixed number of nodes along this direction with the 
border limitation. Let h denote the reachable node number; ᶿ, it is a function of (an initial angular),ttl (the number of maximum hops), 
and v (the number of the claiming messages). Therefore, for a network with n nodes, the detection probability is given by P RDE=h 
(ttl,ᶿ,v)/n shown in fig 4(b).
Storage consumption: The RDE protocol is exceedingly memory-efficient. It  does not rely on broadcasting; thus, no additional 
memory is required to suppress broadcasting flood. The protocol does not demand intermediate nodes to buffer claiming messages,  
all memory requirement lies on the neighbor-list, which, in fact, is a necessary component for all distributed detection approaches.  
Therefore, the protocol consumes almost minimum memory shown in fig 4 (c).
VI CONCLUSION
Sensor nodes lack tamper-resistant hardware and are subject to the node clone attack. So two distributed detection protocols are 
presented: One is based on a distributed hash table, which forms a Chord overlay network and provides the key-based routing,  
caching,  and  checking  facilities  for  clone  detection,  and  the  other  uses  probabilistic  directed  technique  to  achieve  efficient 
communication overhead for satisfactory detection probability. While the DHT-based protocol provides high security level for all 
kinds of  sensor  networks  by one deterministic  witness  and  additional  memory-efficient,  probabilistic  witnesses,  the  randomly 
directed exploration presents outstanding communication performance and minimal storage consumption for dense sensor networks. 
From the analysis and simulation results, the randomly directed exploration protocol outperforms all other distributed detection 
protocols in terms of communication cost and storage requirements, while its detection probability is satisfactory, higher than that of  
line-selected multicast scheme. 
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